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Abstract The development of additive (‘If only I had
done…’) and subtractive (‘If only I had not done….’)
counterfactual reasoning was examined in children with
High Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorders (HFASD)
(n = 72) and typically developing controls (n = 71), aged
6–12 years. Children were presented four stories where
they could generate counterfactuals based on a given
consequent (e.g., ‘you left muddy footprints in the kitchen.
How could that have been prevented?’). Children with
HFASD increasingly used subtractive counterfactuals as
they got older, but controls showed an increase in additive
counterfactuals, which may be linked to their growing
adaptive and flexible skills. Children with HFASD likely
develop different strategies for their counterfactual rea-
soning. The role of IQ and ideational fluency will be
discussed.
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Introduction
People often think about what might have been if some past
event had turned out differently. This type of thinking
about alternatives to past events is called counterfactual
reasoning. Despite our awareness that such alternative
events did in fact not take place, reasoning about them is an
important, pervasive aspect of our daily functioning (Eps-
tude and Roese 2008). It represents one of the defining
hallmarks of the development of complex reasoning skills
(Byrne 2007). In the present study we investigate the
processes that underlie counterfactual reasoning, in par-
ticular the role of the imagination, of children with a dis-
order known to impair imaginative, social and affective
functioning: autism.
Counterfactual reasoning is beneficial. It enables us to
learn from own (or others) previous mistakes—preparing
us to prevent bad outcomes by creating multiple options for
how to handle similar situations in the future. This type of
reasoning contributes to a range of cognitive processes like
creativity, probability judgments, problem solving, deci-
sion-making and social functioning and has shown positive
effects on task performance, satisfaction and self-esteem
and alleviates depression and post-traumatic stress disor-
ders (Epstude and Roese 2008).
The functional benefits of counterfactuals can be
explained by the distinction between two ways of coun-
terfactual reasoning. One may either subtract elements or
actions from reality (‘If only I had not done…’) or add new
elements to reality (‘If only I had done…’). Subtractive
counterfactual reasoning is related to analytical and prob-
lem-solving abilities, and narrowly confined to undoing
elements from the original, factual set of antecedents. The
search space and the number of possible subtractive
counterfactuals are therefore rather limited. The structure
of a subtractive counterfactual corresponds to a modus
tollens inference, where the denial of an outcome (or
consequence) of an inference logically results in the denial
of the antecedent (Guajardo and Turley-Ames 2004).
Children with ASD, in particular those with normal IQs
(high functioning ASD: HFASD), are known for their
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unimpaired analytical and logical abilities, in particular
regarding conditional reasoning about explicit information.
They seem to resort to these strategies to compensate for
the absence of more intuitive and heuristic response strat-
egies seen in typical development (Begeer et al. in press;
Peterson and Galitsky 2004; Pijnacker et al. 2009). Even
mentally retarded children with ASD are skilled at condi-
tional reasoning from explicit counterfactual antecedents
(e.g., ‘If A, then B. If not A, then…?’) (Leevers and Harris
2000; Scott et al. 1999; Peterson and Bowler 2000).
Therefore, children with HFASD are likely unimpaired in
their ability to use subtractive counterfactuals.
Additive counterfactuals, on the other hand, appeal to
the imagination and increase creativity and flexibility with
regard to future situations. With their focus on doing
something that was in fact not done, they serve a stronger
preparative function than subtractive counterfactuals
because they are directly related to the generation of new
adaptive response options that were perhaps not considered
in the past (Epstude and Roese 2008). In principle, additive
counterfactuals allow an open search space and an unlim-
ited number of responses. Impairments on this domain
would fit with the defining and well documented impair-
ments in imagination, behavioral flexibility, and sponta-
neous generation of new ideas (Bigham 2008; Bishop and
Norbury 2005; Turner 1999). Indeed, open-ended coun-
terfactual consequent questions showed less correct
responses in 9–13 year old children with ASD and mental
retardation than in controls (Grant et al. 2004). In sum, it is
likely that the generation of additive counterfactuals is
impaired in children with HFASD.
In the present study we focus on the development of
spontaneous additive and subtractive counterfactual rea-
soning in children with HFASD and typically developing
controls, divided over three age cohorts of 6–8, 8–10 and
10–12 year olds. The increase in memory likely results in
an age effect on the number of additive counterfactuals
(Crowe and Prescott 2003). However, children with
HFASD are expected to lag behind controls in their
development of additive counterfactuals. Since additive
counterfactual reasoning partly depends on the ability to
generate new ideas, we included an ideational fluency task
to investigate whether or not generative ability is a decisive
factor in the use of additive counterfactuals (Bleichrodt
1988).
Method
Participants
The participants were 72 children with HFASD (65 boys, 7
girls) and 71 typically developing children (67 boys, 4
girls). Active parental consent was obtained for all of the
participating children. The diagnostic classification of the
children with HFASD was based on a diagnostic assess-
ment by a child psychiatrist according to the DSM-IV
criteria (APA 2000). None of the HFASD children had co-
diagnoses of additional disabilities (e.g., mental retarda-
tion, deafness) and they all came from families whose sole,
or first, language was Dutch. Groups were similar in racial
and ethnic breakdown and were primarily from middle-
class and upper-middle-class families.
Because this research involved a language-based task,
groups were matched as closely as possible on the basis
of the Verbal IQ and Full-scale IQ as well as gender and
chronological age. Intelligence measures were obtained
in a separate session, through administration of the
Dutch version of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children—III (WISC-III; Kort et al. 2002). There were
no significant group differences in chronological age,
Verbal IQ, Full-scale IQ or ratio boys to girls (See
Table 1).
Procedure and Materials
During a 30-min individual session children were
administered the counterfactual antecedent task and the
RAKIT idea-production task (Bleichrodt 1988). The
counterfactual antecedent task consistently preceded the
idea-production task. All sessions were audio taped and
later transcribed. The transcriptions were scored by two
independent coders.
Counterfactual Antecedent Task
The counterfactual antecedent task (Guajardo and Turley-
Ames 2004) consisted of four stories, for example:
‘Imagine that you are playing outside in the muddy yard.
You are thirsty so you go inside to the kitchen to get a drink
of juice. You walk through the mud, you step over the
doormat, and you keep your shoes on. Because your shoes
are muddy, you get dirt all over the floor.’ Then the chil-
dren were asked, ‘What could you have done so that the
kitchen floor would not have gotten dirty?’. After each
generated antecedent children were asked, ‘Can you think
of anything else?’. Children were encouraged to generate
as many counterfactual antecedents as possible.
RAKIT idea-production task (Bleichrodt 1988) was
included in this study as a measure of ideational fluency.
This task consisted of five different questions (e.g., ‘What
can you see in a shop?’ or ‘What can you drink?’). Chil-
dren were asked to generate as many ideas within a certain
category as possible.
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Scoring
Counterfactual Task
Children received 1 point for each counterfactual ante-
cedent they generated. Subsequently, all antecedents were
categorized as additive (if children added an element, e.g.,
‘wipe your feet’) or subtractive (if they removed an ele-
ment, e.g., ‘not going outside to play’). Inter-rater reli-
ability was satisfactory (Kendall’s s = .77).
RAKIT idea-production task. Scoring methods were
used as described in the RAKIT manual (Bleichrodt 1988).
Children received one point for each plausible response,
and scores on the five questions were summed. Inter-rater
reliability was satisfactory (Kendall’s s = .74).
Results
A 2 (Group: control, HFASD) 9 2 (Structure: additive,
subtractive) 9 3 (Age: 6–8, 8–10, 10–12) MANOVA, con-
trolling for full scale IQ was conducted to examine the effect
of age and diagnosis on the number of additive and sub-
tractive counterfactuals that were generated. There were
significant effects of Age (F(2, 136) = 15.88, p \ .01,
d = .66) and interactions for Structure 9 Age (F(1,
134) = 7.36, p \ .01, d = .45), which were qualified by an
interaction of Group 9 Age 9 Structure (F(2, 136) = 4.63,
p = .05, d = .36).
Post-hoc analysis, controlling for full scale IQ, showed
that for children with HFASD there was an effect of Age
on generating subtractive counterfactuals (F(2, 68) = 3.63,
p \ .05, d = .32), but not on additive counterfactuals (F(2,
68) = 1.21, n.s.). In the control group there was a main
effect of Age on generating additive counterfactuals (F(2,
67) = 15.25, p \ .001, d = .65), but not on subtractive
counterfactuals (F(2, 67) = .97, n.s.). Opposite group dif-
ferences were found in the youngest and the oldest age
samples. In the youngest age group, children with HFASD
generated less subtractive counterfactuals than controls
(F(1, 43) = 5.12, p \ .05, d = .66). However, when co-
varying for non-verbal IQ skills, which were found to differ
in the youngest age cohort, this effect was reduced to a
trend (F(1, 43) = 2.84, p \ .08, d = .50). Within the
oldest age group children with HFASD generated less
additive counterfactuals than controls (F(1, 52) = 4.73,
p \ .05, d = .58).
A 2 (Group: control, HFASD) 9 3 (Age: 6–8, 8–10,
10–12) ANOVA was conducted to examine differences
between children with HFASD and controls on the number
of ideas they generated on the RAKIT idea-production
task. Main effects of Group (F(1, 136) = 7.13, p \ .01,
d = .45) and Age (F(1, 136) = 19.06, p \ .001, d = .73)
indicated that children with HFASD generated fewer ideas
than controls and the mean number of ideas increased with
age in all children (see Table 2). Ideational fluency was
strongly correlated to additive counterfactuals in both
groups (HFASD: r = .43, p \ .001, controls: r = .59,
p \ .001), but no correlations were found with subtractive
counterfactuals. The correlation between ideational fluency
and additive counterfactuals remained significant after
controlling for full scale IQ (HFASD: r = .36, p \ .001,
controls: r = .55, p \ .001). Moreover, after controlling
for differences in ideational fluency, the effects of the
counterfactual task remained significant, with a Group 9
Age 9 Structure interaction, F(2,135) = 4.87, p \ .01,
d = .53, and age effects on additive counterfactuals in the
control group, F(1, 66) = 6.44, p \ .01, d = .61, and on
Table 1 Details of the
participants (means, SDs and
ranges)
HFASD high functioning autism
spectrum disorders; CA
chronological age; VIQ verbal
IQ; PIQ performal IQ; FSIQ full
scale IQ; SD standard deviation
CA (years;months) VIQ PIQ FSIQ
6–8 Years
HFASD (N = 22) 7;2 (0;6) 97.3 (8.9) 82.3 (13.2) 97.4 (12.4)
6;1–8;0 82–109 76–101 75–117
Comparison (N = 24) 7;5 (0;5) 100.0 (13.0) 100.1 (13.5) 100.0 (13.4)
6;5–8;1 80–127 79–130 79–128
8–10 Years
HFASD (N = 21) 8;9 (0;5) 108.7 (15.6) 106.7 (14.1) 107.0 (14.2)
8;1–9;9 77–144 78–133 84–145
Comparison (N = 21) 8;9 (0;5) 102.7 (11.6) 102.3 (11.6) 102.4 (11.7)
8;2–9;9 79–121 77–123 78–121
10–12 Years
HFASD (N = 29) 11;0 (0;8) 104.1 (19.1) 100.8 (15.9) 104.0 (15.9)
10;1–12;8 77–150 72–132 78–138
Comparison (N = 26) 11;2 (0;7) 108.9 (16.7) 108.8 (17.0) 108.9 (16.9)
10;1–12;2 71–142 68–137 70–139
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subtractive counterfactuals in the HFASD group F(2,
67) = 4.47, p \ .05, d = .51.
Discussion
Overall, children with HFASD reported an equal number of
counterfactuals, both additive and subtractive, compared to
controls. This seems in line with earlier findings on adept
counterfactual consequent reasoning in children with ASD
and mental retardation (Leevers and Harris 2000; Scott
et al. 1999). However, this finding was qualified by con-
trasting age effects in the HFASD and control samples.
With age, children in the HFASD group showed a modest
increase in their generation of subtractive counterfactuals,
a finding that was absent in the control group. The control
group, on the other hand, showed an increase in the use of
additive counterfactuals. Both findings were independent
of cognitive ability and ideational fluency. In addition,
compared to age matched controls, the 6–8 year old
HFASD group generated less subtractive counterfactuals,
while the 10–12 year old HFASD group generated less
additive counterfactuals.
The stable number of additive counterfactuals in
HFASD children over the three age cohorts indicates dif-
ferent developmental trajectories with regard to generating
new plans when reasoning about alternative realities.
Although the ideational fluency of HSFASD groups
increased linearly with age, there was no corresponding
increase in the generation of additive counterfactuals.
Instead, even within the limited search space of subtractive
counterfactuals, HFASD children showed an increased
tendency to subtract elements from the factual information
as they got older. This may be related to an acquired ability
to inhibit factual information, which typically develops
during this period (Bartgis et al. 2008). It should be noted
that the increase in subtractive counterfactuals of HFASD
was modest. It did not rise above the level of the control
group, and the 6–8 year old HFASD children did in fact
generate less subtractive counterfactuals than controls. The
onset of using subtractive counterfactuals may occur later
in HFASD than in typically developing children. However,
this is an assumption that needs to be tested, possibly with
a bigger search space, allowing more subtractive responses.
This way, it could be confirmed whether a stable use of
additive counterfactuals remains in contrast with a possible
increase in subtractive counterfactuals in older HFASD
children. Such a finding would fit with the preference of
individuals with HFASD for explicit information and logic
reasoning. Also, their tendency to ‘think within the box’
(Begeer et al. 2007), that is, to narrow responses down to
the explicitly given information fits with the use of sub-
tractive counterfactuals, which can be deductively negated
by applying a simple logical algorithm, rather than induc-
tively generating new responses (Klin et al. 2002). Indeed,
the autistic mind seems suited to work within a closed
system of specified, top down rules (Baron-Cohen et al.
2003).
As expected (Turner 1999), HFASD children showed a
limited capacity for general idea production, but this ele-
ment per se does not seem a sufficient explanation for the
use of additive counterfactuals. The latter induces the use
of generative abilities within the restriction of the factual
content of the story. This requires a child to navigate
between factual and alternative realities. The executive
ability to switch between different perspectives, alternating
between inhibiting the factual or counterfactual reality may
have prevented more adequate use of their imaginative
skills. Future studies will have to more closely delineate
the role of executive functions in counterfactual reasoning.
Furthermore, a complicating factor for the HFASD
children may have been to first override the factual infor-
mation and then generate new ideas. The factual informa-
tion cues a strong explicit prime. While their cognitive
abilities may have enabled them to deny this information,
the uncued, spontaneous generation of alternative response
options may have required too much of their cognitive
flexibility. Indeed, fluency performance of HFASD chil-
dren is most disrupt when words are uncued (Boucher
1988), and additive responses can be compared to a
response to open end questions, which raise problems for
individuals with ASD (Turner 1999).
Among the limitations of the current study is the
absence of longitudinal data. The current cross-sectional
Table 2 Mean and standard deviation of the total number of additive and subtractive counterfactual antecedents children generated in response
to four stories (range 0–?)
HFASD Control
6–8 Years 8–10 Years 10–12 Years 6–8 Years 8–10 Years 10–12 Years
n = 25 n = 21 n = 30 n = 24 n = 21 n = 25
Additive 6.64 (3.12) 8.10 (3.03) 8.37 (2.19) 5.58 (1.35) 9.05 (3.68) 10.04 (2.73)
Subtractive .60 (.50) 1.29 (.96) 1.23 (.86) 1.00 (.72) 1.14 (.79) 1.00 (1.16)
Idea production 31.84 (13.38) 43.24 (18.15) 53.17 (18.40) 37.16 (13.38) 50.33 (12.68) 60.23 (17.70)
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design provides a strong hypothesis for a divergent
development of additive and subtractive counterfactuals in
children with ASD and controls, but the only way to put
this hypothesis to the test is following children over time.
Furthermore, though the current data are based on spon-
taneous reports of counterfactual thinking, the question
remains whether real life situations do indeed elicit coun-
terfactual thinking to the same extent in both groups.
Future studies are needed to provide more accurate mea-
sures of real life use of counterfactual thought and its
relation to adaptive reasoning and behavior.
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